This paper addresses the additional options available to the operational commander in charge of conducting "presence and monitoring" missions with the introduction of an armed capability on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Specifically, the writer argues that the intelligent use and support of armed UAVs can replace selected missions currently being conducted in Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, reducing the threat to manned aircraft and aircrew. It is further argued that many current missions can not be adequately replaced by the armed UAV. The paper presents a brief history of UAV operations, a brief summary of future UAV programs and the current limitations to this family of weapon systems. After a chronology of significant events concerning post-Desert Storm Iraq operations, the writer looks at capabilities the armed UAV could offer the operational commander in executing his assigned mission. iii Contents
Introduction
The interest and investment in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) throughout the United States Department of Defense is immense. Between the services, over 1.1 Billion dollars has been budgeted in Fiscal Year 2003 for UAV systems with 693 Million dollars earmarked for research and development.
i "Quite likely, we could now be designing our last manned aircraft."
ii
Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Gordon R. England
Open almost any military news publication or news report on the war in Afghanistan and you would likely find an article concerning the UAV. The capabilities of this family of weapon systems seem to grow faster than the space available to report on them. They have been used for surveillance, bomb damage assessment (BDA), as an airborne Close Air Support Forward Air Controller (FAC (A)), and beginning on 04 February 2002 as a weapon delivery platform.
Clearly, the successful engagement of a ground target by a Predator UAV firing an AGM-114K
Hellfire missile has added a new lethal capability for the operational commander to employ.
Other milestones achieved during the war in Afghanistan include the first combat employment of the U.S. Air Force Global Hawk, a long endurance high altitude UAV, and the direct link of realtime video from the Predator to AC-130 Gunships.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle programs are gaining wide support and funding even as the military services are looking at programs to cut from the budget. Each military service currently has UAV programs in operation or development and Congress is supporting the program with ever-increasing funding. Even the President of the United States stressed the importance of UAVs in a speech made to the Citadel when he said that the Predator was a good example of a transformational program and that "this unmanned aerial vehicle is able to circle over enemy forces, gather intelligence, transmit information instantly back to commanders, then fire on targets with extreme accuracy."
iii Internationally, there are 55 nations operating some 80 types of UAVs, primarily for reconnaissance. iv The future for further development is bright.
This author believes that the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle with its new capabilities being demonstrated and refined in Afghanistan can alter the way this country currently conducts "presence and monitoring" operations such as Operations Southern Watch or Northern Watch, resulting in a greater economy of effort, greater ability to maneuver and returning the element of surprise to our forces. Additionally, the author believes that the proper employment of UAVs can lead to a reduction of assets currently employed in the conduct of these operations, reducing the risk to aircrews now tasked with this mission. This paper will briefly review the recent history (Gulf War to present) of the UAV and current systems available to support the operational commander. It will also briefly explore the direction the different services are taking in their approach to UAV employment. Current capabilities that the operational commander can employ as well as current limitations will be analyzed. Finally, recommendations for employment of UAVs in presence operations will be explored. Primarily, these issues deal with Command and Control of the UAV and who is tasking the operators. Army Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, the commander of regular U.S. ground forces in Afghanistan, commented in an interview that the transmission of live video images to multiple locations made staffs above his own feel they were in a position to get involved in the battle. xxx Another problem identified in the fighting was the inability to directly communicate with the UAV operators who could be hundreds or thousands of miles away from the commander. xxxi Additionally, there is a real danger that focusing attention to the narrow field-ofview that the Predator provides (seeing the battle through a soda straw) will make the chance of missing something more important more likely. The fidelity of the information provided by the Predator is excellent as compared to other sensors but the area it can cover is extremely small. 
The Historical Trail to the Armed UAV

Armed UAV Operational Possibilities
If properly employed, the development of an armed capability for the Predator and other UAVs could positively affect the military conduct of both the "Watches". They could assume some of the missions currently conducted by manned aircraft, reducing the risk to coalition aircrew. They could conduct missions considered too risky at present such as strikes inside missile engagement zones, strikes north or south of the no-fly boundaries and strikes in high collateral damage areas. If used to their developing potential, they could increase the accuracy and timeliness of strike operations. With their long on-station loiter times, they could greatly increase the coverage now available using manned surveillance platforms. Their use, in place of manned aircraft formations could actually be de-escalatory without a corresponding loss of capability. The introduction of armed UAVs in the theater would reduce predictability; at least in the short term. However, in order to capture the benefits of this increased capability, certain changes must occur in the way operations are conducted.
One distinct advantage of the armed UAV is that the sensor is the shooter. Inaccurate coordinates or errors in passing and entering coordinates between platforms have been responsible for friendly-fire injuries and unintended collateral damage in recent conflicts. Using the capabilities of the armed UAV greatly reduces the chance for human error. Additionally, the relatively slow speed at which the UAV operates and the ability to stay on station without risking aircrews allows more time to determine the value of the target, refine the best aimpoint, and evaluate possible collateral damage concerns. With its long loiter time, the UAV can wait, if necessary, for the situation on the ground to develop favoring an attack. Operational maneuver is increased.
Historically, with notable exceptions, the Coalition's response to Iraqi engagement of patrolling aircraft has been to target air defense weapon systems in the no-fly zones. Usually, the responses have been coordinated multi-aircraft strikes using expensive precision munitions against comparatively less expensive and often non-operational systems. Employing the armed UAV in this area would help balance the cost-versus-gain ratio and allow a better determination (again due to the UAV's speed and loiter ability) that the intended target is in fact an operational system. Operational fires are more effective. Opponents of this approach could argue that a Hellfire equipped Predator or similar armed UAV could not achieve the levels of damage comparable to a coordinated manned-aircraft strike. While this argument is true on the surface, the armed UAV could, in most ground attack missions currently conducted in "the Watches", achieve the damage levels required. Economy of Force is emphasized.
In October Currently, flight operations in both "the Watches" are not conducted continuously. With its air surveillance capability, the Iraqi military is aware of coalition air activity with enough warning to alter its operations and prepare a response. The Predator is capable of far greater onstation times and could be on station between manned aircraft operating cycles or even continuously. The UAV could be employed to elicit a desired response from the enemy in situations of our choosing. One such example would be to draw Iraqi fighters into range of our own. Additionally, by arming some UAVs, the opposing force would have to assume all UAVs were possibly armed. Operational deception is certainly a possibility.
Although not specifically mentioned earlier in the discussion on UAV capabilities, testing is underway to use the Predator as a remote sensor delivery platform and as a platform for directed leaflet distribution. xxxvii These capabilities could aid in shaping the battlefield or influencing local populations. The expanded use of UAVs coupled with the reduction of manned aircraft in monitoring operations could be considered de-escalatory to countries concerned with our presence in the theater.
Current Considerations to UAV Employment
The greatest capability that the armed UAV brings to the operational commander is the ability to instantly engage targets of opportunity when and where located. The additional capability to transmit video to multiple locations and multiple levels of command makes the employment decision more challenging. In order to successfully take advantage of this near realtime engagement capability, the commander in charge of executing a particular operation must have the authority to "pull the trigger" when a valid target is identified, without consulting with higher echelons of command. Rules of engagement (ROE) should be clearly defined with this instant engagement capability in mind. Historically, the United States has preemptively attacked air defense elements in both Iraqi no-fly zones based on hostile intent by mere presence and self defense arguments. The ultimatum issued in January 1993 for Iraq to remove its surface-to air missiles from south of the 32 nd Parallel has never been rescinded, only selectively enforced. rate is their employment in situations considered far too risky for manned aircraft. They will not survive a dedicated, uninhibited air threat. Their slow speed, mentioned previously as an asset, makes them incapable of outrunning a pursuing fighter. They will need protection from air defense fighters on strip alert to perform effectively. Depending on the UAV's operating area, these support aircraft may need to be airborne but could be held on deck until actually needed.
Additionally, the requirement for long-range surveillance cannot currently be replaced by the limited number of Global Hawk UAVs. Finally, the defense of Kuwait and other Gulf nations requires a significant deployed force that a UAV will not be capable of replacing. They can, however, reduce the numbers of manned aircraft currently flying "Watch" missions.
Proposed UAV Dominated Mission
The current United States-led Coalition has flown "the Watches" for the past ten years, using various combinations of manned aircraft. The requirement for many of those manned sites recently relocated in the no-drive zone. After the Global Hawk found a possible site, the Predators would be sent by the CAOC to investigate and determine if site was manned and appeared operational. With previously defined ROE determining that the presence of SAM sites in the no-fly zone was a demonstration of hostile intent, and determining that collateral damage was not a factor, the operational commander could engage the critical component of the site. The armed Predator would be able to loiter in the area long enough for the operational commander to make a determination that the site was indeed real and that collateral damage concerns were considered. Also critical to the targeting process was the fact that no time-consuming aimpoint refinements were needed and targeting data did not pass to another platform, greatly reducing the chance for error. Considering one possible negative outcome for this event, the loss of the Global Hawk or Predator, the extensive Combat Search and Rescue package, consisting of helicopters, fighters and ground attack aircraft would not be required. In Operation Northern Watch, these replaced aircraft could re-deploy elsewhere as required. In Operation Southern Watch, they would still be needed in defense of the Gulf Nations but would not be placed at risk flying "Watch" missions. Considering the risk versus gain ratio in conducting hostile "presence" operations, the increased use of UAVs makes sense.
Conclusion
Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles can be compared to the modern-day patrol cop in any major city. He can't be everywhere but he knows the trouble spots. He is sent on patrol to look for trouble. He is armed with both a weapon and a radio to call for back-up if necessary. More and more, his police cruiser is equipped with a camera to record his actions for further investigation. He has the authority to use deadly force if he feels it is necessary, without having to wake the chief. He understands collateral damage concerns (hot pursuit rules and hostage situations). His mere armed presence serves as a deterrent. He has the SWAT team available if the situation gets out of hand. And finally, if he were a UAV, he could do all this while sitting in the donut shop having coffee.
The armed UAV can increase the flexibility and capabilities of the operational commander charged with conducting "presence and monitoring" operations. It can reduce the risk to aircrew in manned aircraft that would be called to perform the same mission. It can't do everything but it can be an effective, lethal tool in the commander's toolbox. Critical to the successful employment of armed UAVs is a command and control structure that matches their capabilities.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are presented for consideration by both UAV providers and operators.
• Continue developing and testing armed Predator capabilities against both stationary and moving targets. Develop capabilities for employing additional weapons other than the Hellfire missile. Develop training plans for operators as well as employment guidance for commanders.
Incorporate armed Predator operations into training exercises.
• Deploy the armed Predator and Global Hawk to "the Watches" when available. Assign trained, knowledgeable personnel to the CAOC to support armed Predator operations.
Incorporate armed Predators into both current no-fly zone operations. Record "lessons learned"
for follow-on programs and doctrine development. Due to the additional defense responsibilities inherent in Operation Southern Watch, recommend deploy first to Operation Northern Watch to determine if the armed Predator can, in fact, enable a reduction of manned strike aircraft.
Conduct a UAV dominated mission as a validation test.
• Ensure Rules of Engagement maintain the flexibility to employ armed Predators effectively. Consider classifying target categories that could be engaged without submission to higher headquarters for approval.
• Ensure secure, continuous communications between the UAV operators and the CAOC.
• Clearly delineate controlling chain-of-command both above and below the operational commander. Consider limiting live video feeds to only those individuals who have a clearly defined need. Consider giving the UAV controllers an unlisted telephone number where they can't be reached except through the operational commanders' staff.
• Ensure military communication satellites are adequate in quality and quantity to support existing and future UAV systems in every theatre.
• Although not directly related to this study, consider establishing a joint UAV project office to oversee all development and procurement for the DOD in order to ensure the efficient use of funds and reduce unnecessary duplication of effort by the individual services.
